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From Idiots and Lunatics to
Incapacitated Persons and
Respondents: The Evolution of
Guardianship Law in Rhode Island
Mark B. Heffner*
INTRODUCTION

When its iconic “1984” commercial aired in the third quarter
of the 1984 Super Bowl game, Apple announced the availability of
the first Macintosh computer. With its graphical user interface
replacing the “glowing greenish phosphor”1 and “surly c:\˃
prompts”2 of the IBM P.C. launched three years earlier, the first
“Mac” introduced the intuitive user interface, which we now take
for granted.
At the same time a Rhode Islander might be opening his
shiny new Mac, another Rhode Islander who was classified as an
“idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind” could be stripped of her

*

Adjunct Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. B.A.,
Harvard College; J.D., Boston College Law School. Certified Elder Law
Attorney and Principal, Heffner & Associates. The tenacious research of Erin
Paquette, former star student in the author’s Elder Law courses and previous
member of this Law Review, contributed substantially to this article.
Kathleen A. Sherlock, Supervising Attorney of the Rhode Island Disability
Law Center, provided important insights into her work as the chair of the
subcommittee of the Guardianship Commission responsible for producing the
1992 guardianship reform act. Raquel M. Ortiz, Assistant Dean for Library
and Information Services, generously helped to track down difficult-to-locate
previous iterations of the guardianship statute enacted by the Rhode Island
General Assembly.
1. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 95 (Simon & Schuster 2011).
2. WALTER ISAACSON, THE INNOVATORS 363 (Simon & Schuster 2014).

554

HEFFNER_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/20/2016 7:01 PM

GUARDIANSHIP LAW IN RHODE ISLAND

555

personal autonomy. Rhode Island law would have afforded a
probate court no statutory standards to decide whether an
individual would fall into one of these classifications—or others
such as “a habitual drunkard”—which might cause a probate court
to appoint a guardian for her. Apart from required personal
service, the person who found herself on the wrong end of a
guardianship proceeding was afforded no clear procedural rights,
including evidentiary standards or right to counsel, under Rhode
Island’s guardianship statutes.
As this article will describe, the guardianship law in Rhode
Island existing in 1984 was essentially the same that had existed
since 1905. And the 1905 statutes represented only a modest
modernization of Rhode Island’s guardianship laws that had
existed since its colonial era. It would take until 1985—and more
fully not until 1992—before the breakthrough of the woman
throwing a hammer through glass, literally depicted in Apple’s
“1984” commercial, would figuratively occur in Rhode Island’s
guardianship laws.
This article will first examine Rhode Island’s guardianship
laws during the more than 200 years from Rhode Island’s colonial
era until 1985, and label this time as the “Dark Period.” In the
next sections, entitled “First Light” and the “Dawn,” this Article
will discuss how, after this over 200 year period of relative
dormancy, Rhode Island’s guardianship evolved rapidly over the
comparatively short period between 1985 through 1996. This
article will conclude with a section entitled “After the Dawn,”
which will examine what has occurred (and has not occurred) in
the twenty years following this period of rapid change.
Rhode Island’s guardianship laws and its changes will be
viewed through the prism of two areas: the grounds for the
initiation of a guardianship proceeding and the procedural rights
of the individual for whom the guardianship is sought.
Guardianships, of course, involve many other aspects and
requirements; however, focusing on these two significant areas
will provide most vivid insight to Rhode Island’s guardianship
laws as they once existed and as they now are.
To highlight this evolution, this article will focus on
provisions of Rhode Island’s statutes pertaining to guardianship of
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adults.3 For, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed out in
Trustees of House of the Angel Guardian, Boston v. Donovan, “in
this state the probate court derives its jurisdiction wholly from the
statute.”4 Accordingly, this article will emphasize statutory
provisions, discussing reported decisions of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court which interpret the enactments of the General
Assembly.
The terms used in this article for an individual for whom a
guardianship is sought will correlate with the terms generally
used by the statutes during the particular period discussed. For
example, during what this article will call the “Dark Period,” such
an individual will be referred to as the “intended ward.”
Similarly, in discussing this statute from the period labeled “First
Light” onward, the term respondent will generally be used.
Rather than utilizing the cumbersome “he or she,” the
pronouns for gender will be dealt with in a manner also reflective
of the time. Because during the Dark Period guardians were
generally male, the pronoun “he” will be used when referring to a
guardian, with she used to represent the “intended ward.” For the
discussion of the period of the First Light onward, this convention
will be reversed—i.e., the pronoun “she” will be used for the
guardian with “he” referring to the respondent. Exceptions to
these conventions will obviously occur when referring to actual
parties in a reported case.
I.

THE DARK PERIOD 1742–1984

A. Grounds for Guardianship.
As described by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
Tillinghast v. Holbrook, “[i]n 1742, the General Assembly, for the
first time, legislated upon the subject of the appointment of
guardians over the persons or estates of persons other than

3. Prior to Public Law 1992, Chapter 493, referred to later in this
article as the “1992 Act” guardianships of minors and adults were dealt with
in the same statute. Section 5 of the 1992 Act created a new Chapter 15.1 of
Title 33 dealing exclusively with guardianships of minors. See R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 33-15.1-1-1—40 (2012). Public Law 1946, Chapter 1711 created a new
Chapter 16 of Title 33 dealing with veterans guardianships. Both of these
Chapters are outside the scope of this article. See id. § 33-16-1—35
4. 46 A.2d 717, 718 (R.I. 1946).
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infants.”5 The court explained that:
The title of the act indicates its general purpose – “An act
empowering several town councils of this colony to have
the care and oversight of all persons who are delirious,
distracted, or non compos mentis, and their estates.” It
enacts that “it shall be in the power of each town council
in this government to take into their care all persons and
their estates in each respective town, who are delirious,
distracted, or non compos mentis, or such who, for want of
discretion in managing their estates, are likely to bring
themselves and their families to want in misery, and
thereby render themselves and their families chargeable
to the respective towns in which such persons live.” 6
The Tillinghast court also noted that the power formally
vested in the town councils and then in the “several courts of
probate . . . suggest another motive, viz.; to save the towns from
the burthen of supporting such persons after their estate shall be
wasted away.”7
In its 1822 Public Laws, the General Assembly refined the
1742 phrase “the persons or estates of persons other than infants”
to then empower “the courts of probate, in their respective
towns . . . to approve of guardians chosen by minors of fourteen
years of age and upward.”8 It also made this power more succinct
and specific, namely “to appoint guardians of idiots, and all other
persons who are non compos mentis or lunatic, or who for want in
discretion in managing their estates are likely to bring themselves
and families to want and thereby render themselves and families
chargeable to such town.”9
Thus, the General Assembly’s 1822 enactment replaced the
terms “delirious and distracted” of its colonial era predecessor
with the terms “idiot” and “lunatic.”10 The General Assembly,
however, hit its full stride in its enactment of the 1844 Public
Laws:
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

7 R.I. 230, 248 (R.I. 1862).
Id.
Id. at 249.
1822 R.I. Pub. Laws 245.
Id.
See id.
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Whenever any idiot or lunatic, or person non-compos
mentis, or any person who for want of discretion in
managing his estate, shall be likely to bring himself and
family to want, and thereby to render himself and family
chargeable, shall reside or have a legal settlement in any
town, the court of probate of such town shall have the
right to appoint a guardian or person and estate of such
person.11
It is perhaps not surprising that an early or mid-nineteenth
century General Assembly would classify someone as an “idiot or
lunatic or person non-compos mentis,” and further use that
characterization as the basis for subjecting such an individual to a
guardianship. It may be surprising, as this article will reveal,
that these same classifications (with additions such as “habitual
drunkard”) would persist with only minor phrasing changes for
the next 142 years.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Jenckes v. Court of
Probate of Smithfield, interpreting the General Assembly’s 1844
enactment, drew a sharp distinction between the statutory phrase
“idiot and lunatic and person non compos mentis” and an
individual who may be subject to a guardianship based on “want
of discretion in managing his estate.”12 Jenckes involved a will
contest in which one of the allegations was that the will of
Hannah Jenckes should be void because Ms. Jenckes was the
subject of a guardianship at the time of the will’s execution.13
The Jenckes court pointed out that “[t]he order of the Court of
Probate states the testatrix was put under guardianship because
she wanted discretion in the management of her estate.”14 The
Court stated that “such a want of discretion does not imply that
the party was not of a sane mind. If the appointment had been
from idiocy, lunacy, or because the person was non-compos mentis,
the case would have been different.”15
In interpreting Section 3 of An act respecting Guardians
contained in the 1844 Public Laws, the Jenckes court asked: “Can
it be reasonably supposed that the General Assembly intended to
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

1844 R.I. Pub. Laws 272.
2 R.I. 255 (R.I. 1852).
Id. at 255–56.
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259.
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place the last class of persons enumerated on the same footing
with idiots, lunatics, or person non compos mentis in reference to
their capacity to make a will?”16 Answering its own question in
the negative, the court upheld the Smithfield Probate Court’s
ruling admitting Ms. Jenckes will to probate, stating the
following:
The statute in relation to wills authorizes every person of
sane mind to make a will, and is there any reason for
saying that a person, who wants discretion in the
management of his estate, and is likely to spend it, is not
of sane mind? It is not a want of discretion or judgment
which disables; it is insanity. The testator has a right to
exercise his own discretion in judgment, and, if he is
wanting in both, it does not affect the validity of his will if
he be sane. The argument makes want of discretion
which shall subject a party to be put under guardianship
equivalent to the want of sane mind.17
The Jenckes court also reinforced the provisions of the statute
that lack of discretion in managing an estate is not itself sufficient
grounds for the appointment of a guardian. Rather, the court
stated that “the authority to appoint exists only, where the want
of discretion is such that the party would be likely to bring himself
and family to want and thereby become chargeable.”18 The lack of
this element in Ms. Jenckes’ case made the Probate Court’s order
of guardianship “obviously void.”19 Nevertheless, the court found
this fact beside the point in its ruling, for even had it been
present, Ms. Jenckes would have been not have been proven to
lack the “sane mind” required to make a will.20
In Hopkins v. Howard the court again held that “lacking in
discretion in the management of her estate, is not enough to
warrant the appointment of a guardian at the instance of the
overseer of the poor of the town. It must also appear that, by
reason of such want of discretion, she is likely to become a public

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 257–58.
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charge thereon as alleged in the petition.”21
The court in Hopkins determined the decision to appoint a
guardian as “fatally defective” on two grounds.22 First, it found
that the alleged ward had sufficient assets to prevent her from
becoming a charge on the town.23 For example, the court noted
that:
The proof as to respondent’s indiscretion in the managing
of her estate consists mainly of the most ordinary, and in
many cases the most trivial, expenditures such, for
example, as spending all of the money she had at a given
time (in many instances not more than 50 cents or a
dollar) for sugar, tea, butter or some other article of
everyday use in a family.24
The court found that, despite numerous other instances of this
type related in the evidence,
[A]nd, while it appears that she is somewhat eccentric in
some of her transactions, [] there is nothing to show that
she is wasteful or extravagant, and no evidence that she
is likely to become a public charge for want of discretion
in managing her estate as to warrant the court placing
her under guardianship.25
In Gardella v. Gardella the court reiterated its interpretation
of the need for a finding of both lack of discretion in managing
financial affairs and the likelihood to become a public charge prior
to the proper appointment of a guardian under the statute.26 In
an interesting twist relevant in many present day proceedings, the
Gardella court further found that the prospect of Mr. Gardella’s
adult children providing “proof that their perspective inheritances
may be lost” is not the same as the prospect of an individual
becoming chargeable to the town.27 The Gardella court noted that
“[t]he statute is not designed to permit adult children to curb the
action of a parent of sound mind and legal discretion in the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

39 A. 519, 520 (R.I. 1898) (citation omitted).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.
146 A. 621 (R.I. 1929).
Id. at 622.
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disposition or management of his estate. It seeks to protect a
spendthrift, his legal dependents and the town for his folly.”28
What then of the other grounds for guardianship stated in the
statute—i.e., that the individual is purported “idiot or lunatic, or
person non compos mentis”? The statute contains no definition of
any of these three terms. A modern Rhode Island case notes that
“[t]he 1623 James I act used the term ‘non compos mentis’—
literally ‘not master of one’s mind’—in describing what has
evolved into the term ‘unsound mind’ used in § 9-1-19.”29 As it did
in the statute of limitations provisions of section 9-1-19 cited by
the Roe v. Gelineau court, the General Assembly replaced the term
“non compos mentis” in the guardianship statutes with the phrase
“person of unsound mind.”30
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decisions are equally
unhelpful regarding the other terms used in the statute. “The
terms ‘lunatic, idiot or person of unsound mind,’ used in the
statute in their natural and ordinary use, indicate a condition of
mental disability and incapacity.”31 Looking outside of Rhode
Island law for insight to the meaning of the terms “idiot and
lunatic”:
English common law distinguished between two types of
individuals who suffer from mental incapacity: the idiot
and the lunatic. Crudely put, the lunatic was someone
who once possessed a sound mind and somehow lost it;
the idiot never had one. The idiot’s condition was static.
He came into the world with a certain deficient mental
apparatus and generally left it in the same way. For the
idiot there are no past periods of competency to look back
to, no future competency to hope for. The lunatic, on the
other hand, had once been competent and now
experienced alternating periods of lunacy and lucidity.
The very word ‘lunatic’ comes from the Latin ‘lunar’ or
moon, and like the moon the insanity of the lunatic waxed
and waned. Even a lunatic who appeared permanently
insane was presumed potentially curable. He had once
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Roe v. Gelineau 794 A. 2d 476, 485 (R.I. 2002) (citations omitted).
1882 R.I. PUB. LAWS 430.
Champlin v. Probate Court of Exeter, 92 A. 982, 982 (R.I. 1915).
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lived his life on equal mental footing with others, and
there was always that glimmer of hope that he would do
so again.32
In addition to “want of discretion in managing his estate,” in
1872 the General Assembly added to the list of potential
candidates for guardianship to include “any person who from
excess drinking, gaming, idleness, or debauchery of any kind”
might “render himself or his family chargeable.”33 Apparently in
order to emphasize that when it referred to excess drinking it
meant it, the 1872 statutes added a new section authorizing that
“[c]ourts of probate are hereby authorized to appoint guardians of
the person and estates of individual drunkards”34 as well as the
section authorizing “[t]he guardian of any habitual drunkard . . .
to commit the ward to any curative hospital.”35 While the separate
sections dealing with “habitual drunkards” and their potential
commitment appeared again in the 1882 statutes,36 they
disappeared with the enactment of the 1909 General Laws, which
nevertheless retained the references to “habitual drunkard” and
“excess drinking.” 37
B. Conservators
The Court Practices Act of 1905 introduced a new concept in a
section entitled Conservators of the Property of Aged Persons,
which provided as follows:
If a person by reason of advanced age or mental weakness
is unable to properly care for his property the probate
court of the town in which he resides, upon his petition or
the petition of one or more of his relatives or friends, may
appoint a conservator of his property . . . [i]f at the
hearing it appears that such person is incapable of
properly caring for his property, a conservator shall be
appointed, who shall have charge and management of the

32. Louise Harmon, Failing Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine
of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 1, 16 (1990).
33. 1872 R.I. PUB. LAWS. 336.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 1882 R.I. PUB. LAWS 430.
37. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 321-7 (1909).
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property of such person subject to the direction of the
court.38
In enacting this section the legislature, therefore, introduced
at the beginning of the twentieth century two concepts not
previously existing in 18th or 19th century Rhode Island
statutes—that is a proceeding in which the court would supervise
the “charge and management of the property” of an individual
based solely on “advanced age or mental weakness.” Moreover,
unlike the guardianship proceedings, such a conservatorship
proceeding could be initiated upon the petition of the individual
herself.
If appointed, the statute also provided that “such conservator
shall give bond and file inventory as is required of guardians of
estates” and further that “[a]ll provisions of law relative to
accounting and the management, investment, sale, lease or
mortgage by guardians of estates shall apply to the accounting
and to the management, investment, sale, lease or mortgage of
estates by conservators.”39
The General Assembly thus introduced an entirely new
reason that someone might become subject to the supervision of
the probate court—i.e., based solely on “advanced age or mental
weakness,” without any requirement that that individual’s
purported deficiencies would cause her to become a “charge” upon
her town. Moreover, the individual himself could determine that
the supervision of the probate court was necessary and initiate
this proceeding.40 This introduction of conservators became
codified in Rhode Island General Laws 1909 Chapter 321 Sections
37 and 38.
In Whitmarsh v. McGair the Rhode Island Supreme Court
noted that “[i]t is apparent from our statutes and the definition of
the word ‘conservator’ and ‘guardian of the estate’ of a person are
essentially synonymous.”41 At the same time the court noted the
utility and the distinction between the petition for the
appointment of a conservator and that for a guardian:
38. Court and Practice Act of 1905 § 1077 (codified as amneded at R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 33-15-44 (2012)).
39. Id. § 1078.
40. These provisions regarding Conservators subsequently became
codified in General Laws 1909 Chapter 321 § 37 and 38.
41. 156 A.2d 83, 87 (R.I. 1959).
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A person may himself petition for the appointment of a
conservator of his estate. To elderly persons needing help
in the care of their property, the word conservator
appears to be less offensive and less suggestive of the loss
of mentality than the word guardian, but the duties and
responsibilities of conservator appear not to differ
materially from those of a guardian of the estate.42
Like the statute setting forth the basis for the appointment of
a guardian, the statute allowing for the appointment of a
conservator remained essentially unchanged from the time of its
appearance in 1905 until 80 years later in 1985.
C. Procedural Rights of the Intended Ward
In its 1857 Revised Statutes, the General Assembly mandated
that “every court of probate shall, before proceeding, give notice to
all parties, known to be interested” in particular proposed actions
by the probate court.43 Included among actions such as allowing
or disallowing wills submitted for probate and accountings of
fiduciaries was “the appointment of guardians of minors above
fourteen years of age and all other persons other than minors.”44
Like Monty Hall giving game show contestants a choice of doors
number 1, 2 or 3, the legislature provided that such notice:
[M]ay be given in either of the following modes, at the
discretion of the court:—
By causing a citation to be served by some sheriff,
deputy sheriff, town sergeant or constable, upon all
known parties interested at least seven days previous
to proceeding; which citation shall give notice of the
subject – matter of the proceeding, and the time and
place thereof, and shall be served by reading the
same to the parties, if to be found, or by leaving an
attested copy thereof at the last and usual place of
abode, of each of them;
By advertisement of such notice for fourteen days
once a week in some newspaper printed in the State;
42.
43.
44.

Id.
1857 R.I. PUB. LAWS 353.
Id.

HEFFNER_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/20/2016 7:01 PM

GUARDIANSHIP LAW IN RHODE ISLAND

565

By causing the clerk of the court to post up such
notice in some conspicuous place in his office or at
the place at which the court usually meets, and in
one other public place within the town, at least
fourteen days before proceeding.45
In Angell v. Angell, the notice to the prospective ward “was by
publication only.”46 It is not clear from the court’s decision
whether “publication” meant newspaper advertisement or posting
notice in the office of the clerk of the court; however from the
context of the case the publication was most likely via newspaper
advertisement.47 The Probate Court of the Town of North
Providence appointed a guardian for Vashti Angell, despite the
lack of personal service on Ms. Angell.
Counsel for Ms. Angell contended that the statute itself “is
unconstitutional because under it a person may be deprived of his
liberty and property without due process of law by being put
under guardianship without actual notice.”48 The Angell court
was unmoved by Ms. Angell’s argument:
Undoubtedly a personal notice to the intended ward
would be better and more consonant with the usual
course of judicial procedure than notice by publication
only . . . but nevertheless our conclusion is that the
appointment of the appellant was valid notwithstanding
the want of personal notice to the appellee notice having
been given as authorized by the statute.49
In Hamilton v. Probate of North Providence the intended ward
Gideon Hamilton appealed the action of the North Providence
Probate Court appointing a guardian for him, alleging lack of
sufficient notice of the pendency of the petition.50 The Court
noted that “[t]he only notice given was by serving a citation on the
intended ward, and by putting up a notice to all persons interested
in the Town Clerk’s office . . . and [n]o notice was posted in any

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

1857 R.I. PUB. LAWS 354.
14 R.I. 541, 545 (R.I. 1864).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546.
9 R.I. 204 (R.I. 1869).
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other place.”51 In dismissing Mr. Hamilton’s appeal for lack of
notice, the Court stated that “[t]he Revised Statutes, chapter 152,
prescribes the mode of notice in these cases, and this may be,
either, 1st, by serving a citation on all known parties interested;
2d, by advertisement in a newspaper; 3d, by causing the clerk of
the court to post up such notice in some conspicuous place in his
office, or in the place at which the court usually meets, and in one
other public place, etc., etc.”52
The Court found that while notice was served on the intended
ward Mr. Hamilton, the other two options for notice were either
absent or deficient.53 Rejecting Mr. Hamilton’s contention that
despite personal service, notice was ineffective because his wife
and his son were interested parties and were not notified, the
Court found that the “citation served on the intended ward
constituted sufficient legal notice.”54
Until the enactment of the Court Practices Act of 1905, the
legislature continued to afford the probate courts this menu of
three notice options. In its 1872 general statutes the General
Assembly carved out yet a fourth option for “the appointment of
the guardian of any inmate of any asylum for the insane.”55 The
statute directed the process server to:
[A]pply to the physician in charge of the asylum where
the person upon whom the notice to be served is confined;
and if said physician shall return, upon oath, on the back
of such notice that in his opinion it would be injurious to
the mental health of such person to have such notice
served upon such person, the officer or person charged
with the service of said notice shall leave a copy thereof,
with physician’s return thereon with the keeper of said
insane asylum and shall return said notice to the court
which issued the same without further service.56
Thus, if the intended ward were an “inmate of any asylum for
the insane,” it is possible, and even likely, that she would have

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 205.
Id. (alteration in orginal).
Id.
Id.
1872 R.I. PUB. LAWS 370.
1872 R.I. PUB. LAWS 371.
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received no notice whatever that she was the subject of a pending
guardianship petition. For a process server would have certainly
found it easier to get the physician to “sign off” on the notice
rather serving it on the intended ward. Similarly, physicians in
charge of such institutions would likely have agreed to avoid
actual notice on the individual purportedly for her own benefit
and to avoid the intrusion of process server within the facility.
This potential—indeed likelihood—that certain individuals could
be subjected to guardianships without any notice continued
unchanged until the 1992 Act.
The Court Practices Act of 1905, for the first time, specifically
required that “[n]o person shall be appointed guardian of the
person of another, unless notice of the application for such
appointment has been served upon the intended ward in person at
least fourteen days prior to any action on said application . . . .”57
The Court Practices Act of 1905, however, continued to provide an
exception to this personal service requirement in the instance
when “application shall be made to a probate court for the
appointment of a guardian of any person confined to an asylum for
the insane.”58 This revision of the Court and Practices Act of 1905
was codified in the Rhode Island General Laws beginning in
1909.59
The Court Practices Act of 1905 continued the “appointment
or approval of a guardian” as among the actions delineated for
which a probate court was required to give notice before
proceeding,60 specifying, however, that it “shall be given by
advertisement of a notice for fourteen days, once a week, at least,
in such newspaper, printed in English and published in the county
in which the matter is to be acted upon, as the probate court by
general rule or special order may designate for that purpose.”61 In
addition to making this notice by newspaper advertising
mandatory, the legislature in the Court and Practices Act of 1905
also made more specific the previous requirement that the
advertisement be published “in some newspaper published in the

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Court and Practice Act of 1905 ch. 50 § 1056.
Id. ch. 38 § 1077.
33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 321-16 (1909).
Court and Practice Act of 1905 ch. 38 § 764.
Id. § 769.
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State.”62 This mandatory and more specific requirement of
newspaper advertising by the Court was also codified in the
General Laws revision of 1909.63
In 1982 the General Assembly belatedly addressed the
objections made by the appellant Mr. Hamilton 113 years
earlier,64 by enacting new section 17.1 of Chapter 15, Title 33
entitled Notice to Children or Heirs-at-Law of Ward.65
Specifically, the legislature provided that “[n]o petition for
conservatorship or guardianship shall be heard and no person
shall be appointed guardian or conservator of the person or estate
of another unless notice of the application for such appointment
together with notice of the date, time and place set for hearing has
been given to the prospective ward’s children and/or heirs at
law.66 The 1982 version of this statute required that “[n]otice
shall be given by registered mail, return receipt requested to the
prospective ward’s children at their last known address, or if there
be no children, then to the prospective ward’s heirs-at-law.”67
In 1983 the legislature tempered its enthusiasm for the extent
of this notice by deleting the requirement of notice to children and
heirs-at-law by registered mail return receipt requested instead
allowing such notice to be given by “regular mail, postage
prepaid.”68 However, perhaps an exchange for this downgrading
in the type of mailing, the legislature added that this notice be
given “at least ten (10) days before the date set forth for hearing
on said petition . . . .”69 In this same enactment, the legislature
also required that this ten-day mail notice be given to the
prospective ward’s spouse.70 In 1987, the General Assembly
clarified the meaning of “heirs-at-law” in the statute, by specify
individuals “who would inherit the prospective ward’s estate
pursuant to the terms of Section 33-1-1.”71
In addition to providing no definitions of ‘idiot, lunatic, or
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
32 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 309-5 (1909).
See Hamilton v. Probate of North Providence, 9 R.I. 204 (R.I. 1869).
1982 R.I. Pub. Laws 1262.
Id.
Id.
1983 R.I. PUB. LAWS 374.
Id.
Id.
1987 R.I. PUB. LAWS 171.
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person of unsound mind’ (the term formerly known as non compos
mentis) the Rhode Island guardianship statutes provided no
standard for a court to determine how to determine whether an
intended ward met these classifications. For example, was
documentary evidence or oral testimony from the intended ward’s
physician required? What other evidence was needed to persuade
a probate court that the individual was an “idiot, lunatic or person
of unsound mind?” The reported decisions of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court did not reference the types of evidence that was
necessary to put an intended ward under guardianship.
Similarly, neither the guardianship statutes nor the reported
cases provide any insight to the evidentiary standards to be
applied. Specifically, did the probate courts in assessing the
evidence before it apply a preponderance of the evidence or a clear
and convincing standard?
Moreover, once a guardian had been appointed, there was no
statutory mechanism for the then ward to terminate or modify the
terms of the guardianship to which she was subjected. Beginning
with the 1857 revised statute, the General Assembly provided a
mechanism for a court to remove a guardian “who by reason of
absence, sickness, insanity or other cause, shall become incapable
of executing his trust, or who shall neglect or refuse to do the
duties thereof, or who shall waste of estate of his ward.”72 While
this provision for the removal of the guardian remained nearly
entirely unaltered until the 1992 Act, there existed nowhere prior
to the 1992 Act for any mechanism for the termination or
modification of the guardianship itself.
II. FIRST LIGHT 1985–1988

In 1985, the General Assembly altered the grounds by which
a probate court could appoint a guardian. These changes were
both substantive and cosmetic. Gone were the grounds based on
an individual’s purported status as an “idiot, lunatic, or person of
unsound mind.” Gone also was the ability of a probate court to
appoint a guardian based on categories of purported behavior (e.g.,
“excess drinking, gaming, idleness or debauchery”). Also
eliminated was a potential guardianship based on “want of
72. Revised Statutes of the State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations, 1857, Ch. 152, Sec. 11.
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discretion in managing his estate” which might lead to the
individual or his family being public charges.
Inserted in place was a functional standard. Specifically,
probate courts could now appoint guardians for an individual “who
is unable to manage his or her estate and is unable to provide for
his or her personal help and safety as a result of mental/or
physical disability.”73 Specifically, such “mental or physical
disability as determined by the court on the basis of oral or
written evidence under oath from a qualified physician.”74
On the cosmetic side, the legislation replaced the phrase
“mental weakness” with “mental disability” for the grounds of the
probate court to appoint a conservator.75 Likewise the description
of “an asylum for insane” was replaced by “medical facility.”76
The 1985 legislature’s elimination of the potential
appointment of a guardian based merely on an individual’s
purported status (idiot, lunatic, habitual drunkard, etc.) with a
functional standards (unable to manage his or her estate or his or
her personal health and safety) provided a glimmer of light to the
dark, anachronistic standards which had stood for in Rhode
Island’s guardianship statutes since the early to mid-19th century.
As did providing an actual evidentiary basis (oral of written
evidence under oath from a qualified physician) that the
individual’s “mental and/or physical disability” rose to the level
which would warrant the appointment of a guardian by the
probate court.
In practice, however, such light proved in some ways a false
dawn. For in practice it is now meant that petitioners needed only
produce a one sentence letter from any “qualified physician.” And
such a “qualified physician” could have had the briefest of
encounters with the intended ward in order to meet this
requirement.
Before 1986 probate courts had the ability to appoint
guardians “of the person and estate, or of the person or estate” of
an individual.77 The statute provided for no nuance or tailoring of
the terms of the guardianship to meet the particular needs of an
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

1985 R.I. PUB. LAWS 260.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id.
1986 R.I. PUB. LAWS 264.
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individual. This changed with Public Law 1986, Chapter 176 by
the insertion of the following two paragraphs to [General Laws
section to which inserted]:
Within its powers under this chapter the probate court
may limit the scope of the powers and duties of a
guardian to the terms best suited to assist the ward in
handling some but not all of his or her affairs, and may
structure such guardianship to properly assist the ward
in those areas where the ward may lack decision making
ability.
The certificate of appointment issued to said guardian
shall clearly state that it is a limited guardianship.78
For the first time, therefore, the guardianship statute
permitted a court to move beyond the “one size fits all”
appointment of a guardian of a person and of her estate. The 1986
legislation also introduced the notion of an individual’s “decision
making ability”—the lynchpin to the more significant reforms of
the statute to come shortly.
In 1987 the General Assembly further modified the statute
enabling probate courts to appoint conservators.79 The changes,
though seemingly superficial, were actually substantive.
Specifically, previously an individual seeking the appointment of a
conservator was required to be of “advanced age” or have a
“mental disability.” The 1987 legislation eliminated the adjective
“mental” before disability as well as the requirement of “advanced
age” in order to initiate a conservatorship. Accordingly, an
individual could seek the appointment of a conservator based on
his or her own “disability” alone. 80
While the General Assembly was providing some light on the
horizon with these revisions to the guardianship statutes,
nationally the dawn was beginning to break. The catalyst was a
series of articles which appeared in 1987 produced by the
Associated Press (“AP”) which resulted from a national study of
state guardianship proceedings.81
The AP’s report entitled
78.
79.
80.
81.

BOOK

Id.
See 1987 R.I. PUB. LAWS 290.
Id.
ROBERT B. FLEMING & LISA NACHMIAS DAVIS, ELDER LAW ANSWER
11-3 (3d ed. 2013); see Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of

HEFFNER_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2016 7:01 PM

572 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:554
“Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System,” highlighted both
procedural and substantive problems in state court guardianship
proceedings.82
The AP report sparked the convening of the National
Guardianship Symposium in July, 1988 at the Johnson
Foundation’s Wingspread Conference Center.83 Participants in
this program (hereinafter “Wingspread”) included probate judges,
physicians, law professors, attorneys from elder advocacy agencies
and private practice attorneys as well as diversity of other
members, including a bioethicist and an anthropologist.84
Wingspread produced thirty-one recommendations “intended
to better safeguard the rights of adult disabled wards and
proposed wards [and] . . . to provide for the wards’ needs while
maximizing
individual
autonomy.”85
Among
these
recommendations were the following:
 Encouraging alternatives to guardianship, such use of
durable powers of attorney, and “more appropriate
uses of guardianship.86
 “Minimum [d]ue [p]rocess safeguards,” such as
personal service on a respondent by “[a] court officer
dressed in plain clothes and trained to communicate
and interact with elderly and disabled persons,” right
to counsel, and rights at the guardianship hearing,
including to compel the attendance of and to confront
and cross-examine witnesses and a “clear and
convincing standard of proof.”87
 A definition of incapacity focused on, among other
elements, that “incapacity is a legal, not a medical,
term,” that “incapacity may be partial or complete,”
and that “age, eccentricity, poverty or medical
the Elderly: An Ailing System Part I: Declared ‘Legally Dead’ by a Troubled
System, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 19, 1987), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/
1987/Guardians-of-the-Elderly-An-Ailing-System-Part-I-Declared-LegallyDead-by-a-Troubled-System/id-1198f64bb05d9c1ec690035983c02f9f.
82. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GUARDIANSHIP SYMPOSIUM AND
POLICY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, iii (A.B.A. 1989).
83. Id. at iv.
84. Id. at iv, 35–36.
85. Id. at iv.
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 9–10.
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diagnosis alone should not be sufficient to justify a
finding of incapacity.”88
Courts “limit the scope of and tailor the guardianship order to
the particular needs of the ward” and that the guardian
periodically report to the court the guardian’s efforts to “maximize
self-reliance, autonomy and independence” of the ward.89
III. THE DAWN 1990-1996

A. Guardianship Commission
The real transformation in Rhode Island’s guardianship laws
began with the approval in 1990 of House Bill 90-H 7925A entitled
“Joint Resolution Creating a Special Legislative Commission to
Study the Laws on Guardianship.”
In addition to members of the Rhode Island House of
Representatives and Rhode Island Senate, and the directors or
their designees of various state agencies, this twenty-five-member
commission (the “Guardianship Commission”) included a diverse
number of stakeholders in legal issues involving the elderly and
disabled, including a representatives of a senior citizens’ center,
the National Gray Panthers Association, a mental health
association, the American Association of Retired Persons, and the
Rhode Island Council of Senior Citizens.90 Specifically mandated
among the two members were to be two “physicians specializing in
geriatrics.”91 There was also to be one probate judge, the chief
judge or his designee of the Family Court and two attorneys.92
Thus the Guardianship Commission, while tasked with reviewing
Rhode Island’s guardianship laws, was designed not to be lawyercentric.
B. The 1992 Act
The Guardianship Commission’s work resulted in House Bill
92-H 9792, which following its approval in July 1992, became 92
Public Law 493 (the “1992 Act”). The 1992 Act eliminated entire
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 20.
90. H.B. 90-H 7925A (R.I. 1990). The author, in his then capacity as a
State Representative, served on the Guardianship Commission.
91. H.B. 90-H 7925A (R.I. 1990).
92. Id.
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sections of Chapter 15 of Title 33, replacing them with new
provisions. Of those provisions of Chapter 15 not deleted and
replaced, the majority were revised.
The intention of the legislature in enacting the 1992 Act was
codified in new Section 1 of Chapter 15 Title 33:
The legislature finds that adjudicating a person totally
incapacitated and in need of a guardian deprives such
person of all his or her civil and legal rights and that such
deprivation may be unnecessary. The legislature further
finds that it is desirable to make available, the least
restrictive form of guardianship to assist persons who are
only partially incapable of caring for their needs.
Recognizing that every individual has unique needs and
differing abilities, the legislature declares that it is the
purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by
establishing a system that permits incapacitated persons
to participate as fully as possible in all decisions affecting
them; that assists such persons in meeting the essential
requirements for their physical health and safety, in
protecting their rights, in managing their financial
resources, and developing or regaining their abilities to
the maximum extent possible; and that accomplishes
these objectives through providing, in each case, the form
of assistance that least interferes with the legal capacity
of a person to act in his or her own behalf. This chapter
shall be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.93
The lynchpin of the reforms of the 1992 Act was mandating
use of a seventeen page “Functional Assessment Tool” (FAT), in
place of the potentially one-paragraph physician’s letter as the
basis for a probate court’s determination of whether or not an
individual required guardianship.94 Gone was the potential that
someone could be made the subject of a guardianship proceeding
based merely on his alleged status as an “idiot, lunatic, person of
unsound mind,” or as a “habitual drunkard.” Instead, the
individual’s functional abilities and “capacity to make decisions”
would be determinative.95
93.
94.
95.

1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1976.
Id. at 1978.
Id.

HEFFNER_FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

5/20/2016 7:01 PM

GUARDIANSHIP LAW IN RHODE ISLAND

575

New Section 4 of Chapter 15 of Title 33 provided in part that:
[T]he court shall authorize the guardian to make
decisions for the individual in only those areas where the
court finds, based on the functional assessment, that the
individual lacks the capacity to make decisions. The
court must strike a delicate balance between providing
the protection and support necessary to assist the
individual and preserving to the largest degree possible
the liberty, property and privacy interests of the
individual.96
New Rhode Island General Laws Section 33-15-4(a) further
stated that “[t]he court shall not appoint a guardian or limited
guardian if the court finds that the needs of the proposed ward are
being met or can be met by a less restrictive alternative or
alternatives.”97 The mere existence of ostensibly less restrictive
alternatives to guardianships such as durable powers of attorney
and joint property arrangements, however, do not preclude the
appointment by a court of a guardian. Rather, such a less
restrictive alternative must be an effective mechanism for
alternative decision-making for the respondent.
The 1992 Act incorporated into a revised Rhode Island
General Laws Section 33-15-17.1 which enhanced the existing
provisions pertaining to notice required to a respondent, as well as
that to spouses, children or heirs.98 The 1992 Act also prescribed
a particular form of, and manner in which, notice must be served
on a respondent. Specifically, it mandated that:
This notice shall be in plain language, large type and
shall include the time and place of the hearing, the
possible loss of liberty if the petition is granted, and shall
inform the respondent of his or her rights including: the
court appointment of a guardian ad litem, the right to a
hearing and to be present at the hearing to confront
96. Id. at 1977.
97. Id.
98. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-17.1(e) (West 2006); 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws
1968. The 1992 Act added the additional requirement that notice by mail be
provided to “the administrator or any care and treatment facility where the
respondent resides or receive primary services [and] . . . any current provider
of primary support service and primary medical caregivers.” § 33-15-17.1(e).
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witnesses, present evidence, contest the petition, object to
the appointment of a particular individual as guardian,
request that limits be placed on the guardian’s powers,
and the right to counsel.99
In addition, “[t]he court officer that serves this notice shall be
dressed in plain clothes” and “[h]e or she shall have experience
dealing with individuals who may lack decision making ability.”100
Further, the 1992 Act added the requirement that the process
server both present and read the notice to the respondent.101
In addition to enhanced notice requirements, other previously
unaddressed aspects of due process for respondents were explicitly
addressed in the 1992 Act. Specifically, a new section, entitled
“Hearing,” first made clear that “[n]o limited guardian or guardian
shall be appointed until after a hearing on the petition.”102 This
section also required that “[t]he respondent shall have the right to
be present at the hearing and all other stages of the
proceedings.”103
A respondent was also for the first time
specifically “be allowed to (i) [c]ompel the attendance of witnesses;
(ii) [p]resent evidence; and (iii) [c]onfront and cross examine
witnesses.”104 The 1992 Act also provided that the standard of
proof to be utilized in determining whether a guardian should be
appointed is that of “clear and convincing evidence” and that “[t]he
Rhode Island rules of evidence shall apply.”105
The 1992 Act also introduced another new section to the
guardianship statute, mandating the appointment of a guardian
ad litem in every petition for the appointment of a guardian.106
The guardian ad litem was to have both an investigatory and
reporting function. Regarding her investigation, the guardian ad
litem had four statutory duties:
(1) Personally visiting the respondent;
(2) Explaining to the respondent the nature, purpose, and
legal effect of the appointment of a guardian;
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

§ 33-15-17.1(b); 1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1967.
§ 33-15-17.1(C); 1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1968.
§ 33-15-17.1(D); 1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1968.
1992 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1978.
Id. at 1979.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(3) Explaining to the respondent the hearing procedure,
including, but not limited to, the right to contest the
petition, to request limits on the guardian’s powers, to
object to a particular person being appointed guardian, to
be present at the hearing and to be represented by legal
counsel;
(4) Informing the respondent of the name of the person
known to be seeking appointment as guardian.107
Following her investigation, Rhode Island General Law
section 33-15-7(c) requires the guardian ad litem to make the
following determinations:
(i) Whether the respondent wishes to be present at the
hearing.
(ii) Whether the respondent wishes to contest the
petition.
(iii) Whether the respondent wishes limits placed on the
guardian’s powers;
(iv) Whether the respondent objects to a particular person
being appointed guardian, and;
(v) Whether the respondent wishes to be represented by
legal counsel.108
After doing so, the guardian ad litem is then required to “inform[]
the court of those determinations.”109
If the respondent wishes to exercise any of these rights, she
may be represented by legal counsel.110 If she does not secure her
own counsel, the court will appoint legal counsel and, if necessary,
bear the cost of securing the counsel.111
A key feature of the 1992 Act was to recognize that not only
do individuals have different levels of decision making capacity,
but also such capacity may change over time for a particular
individual. Specifically, the 1992 Act provided that “[i]f, because

107. Id. at 1980.
108. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-7(b)(7) (West 2006); see also 1992 R.I. Pub.
Laws 1980-81.
109. Id.
110. 1992 R.I. Pub. Laws 1981.
111. Id.
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of a change in the partially incapacitated individual’s level of
decision making ability, the scope and duties of the limited
guardianship order no longer meet the needs of the individual
and/or fail to afford the individual as much autonomy as possible,
modification of the limited guardianship order is required.”112
The 1992 Act provided that such “[m]odification can be
accomplished by agreement of the partially incapacitated
individual, his or her counsel, if any and the limited guardian.”113
If such agreement is reached, the statute provided that a proposed
consent order would be prepared and submitted to the court.114
However, if agreement could not be reached on such consent order,
any of the parties—including the individual who was the subject
of the guardianship—may request a hearing on such a proposed
modification of the guardianship order.115
The potential for modification was to be enhanced by the
addition in the 1992 Act of the requirement of an “annual status
report.”116 The statute also mandated the specific elements of
such an annual status report to be the following:
(1) The residence of the ward;
(2) The condition of the ward;
(3) Any changes the limited guardian [or] guardian
perceives in the decision making capacity of the ward;
and
(4) A summary of actions taken and decisions made on
behalf of the ward by the limited guardian or guardian.117
C. 1994 Act
Of the stunning changes effected by the 1992 Act to Rhode
Island’s guardianship laws, the one having the most impact on
practice in probate courts was the replacement of the requirement
of the (usually one page) physician’s letter with a seventeen-page
FAT. Although required to be submitted to the court along with
the petition for guardianship, the FAT was not required to be
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1978.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1981.
Id.
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completed by a physician; rather, it could be completed by “any
professional whose training and experience aid in the assessment
of functional capacity.”118
The Guardianship Commission continued its work, focusing
on potential modifications to the 1992 Act needed in order to
enable these reforms to work most effectively in practice.119 The
Commission found that because of its length and complexity, the
FAT was often difficult to complete, particularly by physicians. In
addition, the then serving Probate Judge of Providence, who also
served on the Guardianship Commission, expressed the view that
evidence supplied by a physician was of a unique reliability to a
probate court.
The continuing work of the Guardianship Commission
resulted in the enactment by the General Assembly of 1994 R.I.
Pub. Laws Ch. 359 (the “1994 Act”). The major impact of the 1994
Act was a six-page Decision-Making Assessment Tool (DMAT) to
replace the seventeen-page FAT.120 In addition to its virtue of
relative brevity, the DMAT focused on the extent to which an
individual possesses decision-making capacity.121 The 1994 Act
also provided that, while additional DMATs could be completed
and submitted to a probate court for consideration, “[t]he
individual’s treating physician must complete the decision-making
assessment tool.”122
The 1994 Act contained other modifications to statutory
provisions revised by the 1992 Act which the Guardianship
Commission found to be friction points in the effective
implementation to reforms desired by the General Assembly in the
1992 Act. Specifically, in order to avoid delays in guardianship
hearings, the 1994 Act mandated that the probate courts appoint
a guardian ad litem simultaneous with the acceptance by the
court of the petition for guardianship.123 Similarly, in order to
prevent disparate forms of annual status reports, the 1994 Act

118. Id. at 1979.
119. The author, in his capacity as a then State Representative, in 1993
became Chairman of the Guardianship Commission.
120. 1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1446.
121. 1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1445.
122. 1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1446.
123. 1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1447.
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created a statutory form of annual status report.124 Finally, the
1994 Act deleted the requirement of mail notice of the pendency of
a guardianship petition to be provided to “any current provider of
primary support services and primary medical caregivers”
mandated by the 1992 Act, inserting instead that such notice be
given to “any individual or entity known or reasonably known to
the petitioner to be regularly providing protective services to the
respondent.”125
C. Conservatorships
The reforms begun with the 1992 Act introduced to Rhode
Island’s guardianship statutes requirements such as a formal
assessment of individual’s functional ability by a physician who
had examined the respondent, the potential for evidentiary
hearings and other features designed to protect the procedural
rights of respondents, and the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
But what if an individual herself wished to have the
supervision of a probate court in the management of her financial
affairs? However benign the intention of the initiation of a
guardianship petition, with the reforms of 1992 Act the procedure
to initiate and establish a guardianship became necessarily
adversarial—a petitioner and respondent, service of process, etc.
Such mechanisms would be unnecessary and add expense and
potential delay for someone who voluntarily wished to have a
third party, under the jurisdiction of a probate court, manage her
finances.
But why would a person subject herself to oversight of her
financial affairs by a probate court? Why not simply appoint
someone to act as agent under a durable financial power of
attorney? One reason might be that the person whom the
individual has selected as her fiduciary is only willing to serve in
that capacity with the imprimatur and supervision of a court,
perhaps due to a contentious family circumstance. Another is that
the establishment of certain special needs trusts under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396(d)(4)(A) requires the involvement of a court.
A
conservatorship enables the individual to seek the involvement of
a probate court without the inherently adversarial and more
124.
125.

1994 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1449.
Id.
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expensive procedure of a guardianship proceeding.
The Guardianship Commission found that such the
mechanism for such a tailored and less restrictive procedure
already existed in Chapter 15 of Title 33—specifically in Section
44 allowing a probate court to appoint a conservator for an
individual. As noted above, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
pointed out that that the terms conservator and guardian of the
estate are essentially synonymous.126 To the utility further noted
by the Whitmarsh Court in 1959 of a conservatorship versus a
guardianship proceeding in preserving personal dignity127 is now
added avoiding the expense and formality resulting from the
reforms to a guardianship proceeding.
The Guardianship
Commission, and ultimately the General Assembly, finding such a
tailored and less restrictive already in place in the statute, elected
to leave Rhode Island General Law section 33-15-44 intact to
serve this function.128
D. Probate Uniformity Act of 1996
Section 1 of 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws chapter 110 provided as
follows:
The General Assembly finds that due to the aging of
Rhode Island’s population and other societal demands,
126. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 156 A.2d 83, 87 (R.I. 1959).
127. Id.
128. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-44 (West 2006). The statute also enables
“one or more of his or her relatives or friends” to initiate a conservatorship
petition.” Id. In view of the sweeping due process protections for a
respondent in a guardianship proceeding, such as enhanced notice and
hearing rights, as well as the requirement of a DMAT and the report of a
guardian ad litem, it is illogical to conclude that the Guardianship
Commission and the General Assembly intended to create an “end run” via a
conservatorship for such “relatives or friends” to petition a probate court to
take over management of a person’s financial affairs absent her overt
consent. Id. Rather, given the extensiveness of the legislation which arose
from the Guardianship Commission’s deliberations and which was enacted by
the General Assembly, both the Guardianship Commission and General
Assembly, having concluded that a mechanism for an individual to initiate
her own petition for a probate court-appointed and supervised fiduciary to
manage her estate should remain, did not dive deeply into the language of §
33-15-44 to discover this “relatives or friends” language. In short, the
retention of this phrase was an understandable oversight by the
Guardianship Commission and the General Assembly in the midst of a
virtual re-writing of the procedure for the initiation of guardianships.
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increased demands have been placed on the probate
courts of each city and town. Accordingly, in order to
provide further guidance to the statutorily created courts
to assist them in the prompt and efficient administration
of decedent’s and guardianship estates, the General
Assembly has enacted the following revisions to sections
of the Rhode Island General Laws dealing with probate
jurisdiction, practice and appeals. These revisions will be
known as the Probate Uniformity Act of 1996.129
As indicated by that preamble, the Probate Uniformity Act of
1996 (the “1996 Act”)—in contrast to the 1992 and 1994 Acts,
which dealt exclusively with guardianships—dealt with other
chapters of Title 33 of the General Laws, as well as Chapter 8 of
Title 9 pertaining to probate courts. Nevertheless, the 1996 Act
included significant modification to provisions of Chapter 15 of
Title 33, pertaining to guardianships.
The first of these was a requirement that the DMAT be
completed by “a physician who has examined the respondent.”130
The investigatory duties of the guardian ad litem were also
expanded by the 1996 Act to include the requirement that the
guardian ad litem “[r]eview the decision/assessment making
tool(s), petition for guardianship/limited guardianship, and the
notice,” as well as [i]nterview “the prospective guardian by
telephone or in person.”131 The guardian ad litem’s reporting
duties to the probate court were also expanded to include a
determination as to “[w]hether the respondent wishes to be
represented by legal counsel.”132
In order to avoid the problem that had developed of guardian
ad litem reports appearing on the same date as the hearing on the
guardianship petition, the 1996 Act added the requirement that
“[u]nless waived by the court, at least three (3) days prior to the
hearing, the guardian ad litem shall file a report substantially in
the form as set forth in section 33-15-47 with the court and shall
mail or hand-deliver a copy to each attorney of record.”133
In order to ensure a forum for ongoing study and development
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 560.
1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 572.
1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 574.
Id.
Id.
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of proposed legislation to continue the modernization of Rhode
Island’s probate laws, the 1996 Act included a statutorily created
commission for that purpose. This commission, officially titled “A
Legislative Commission to Study the Feasibility of Modernizing
Probate Law and Procedure and to Make Recommendations
Therefor,”134 has become known as the “Probate Commission.”
IV. AFTER THE DAWN 1997–2015

The assimilation by courts and practitioners of the virtual rewriting of Rhode Island’s guardianship laws by the General
Assembly in the 1992 Act, begun with the 1994 and 1996
legislation continued thereafter, the statutory sections of Chapter
15 receiving the most attention were two of those first introduced
in 1992 and 1994—those involving the DMAT and guardians ad
litem.
DMAT. As a result of the experience by courts, particularly in
contested guardianships, the requirements for the physician
completing the DMAT, revised in 1996 Act, was again revised in
2004.135 In 2004, the General Assembly deleted the adjective
“treating,” inserting instead “primary care” in describing the
physician required to complete the DMAT, providing further “if
the individual’s primary care physician is not available or if the
individual does not have a primary care physician the decisionmaking assessment tool must be completed by a physician who
has examined the individual.”136
The General Assembly in 2004 also made a limited exception
to the mandate, introduced in the 1992 Act and continuing
thereafter, that a DMAT must be filed with any guardianship
petition. Specifically, “the probate court may excuse the filing of a
decision-making assessment tool only on a petition for temporary
guardianship in extraordinary or emergency circumstances and
upon the provision of other competent evidence.”137
In 2007, the General Assembly again revisited which
physician should be required to complete the DMAT.
In
consolidating the notions of both the primary care physician and a
134.
135.
136.
137.

1996 R.I. PUB. LAWS 604.
See 2004 R.I. PUB. LAWS 2677.
Id.
Id.
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physician who had treated the respondent, Rhode Island General
Law section 33-15-4(a) was again modified to provide that a
DMAT “must be completed by the respondent’s primary care
physician, if one exists and is available, otherwise by a physician
who has examined and treated the respondent.”138
A. Guardians ad litem
Given the novelty of the mandated use of guardians ad litem
in each guardianship proceeding, it is not surprising that there
developed wide variations in the reports of guardians ad litem, the
method of their selection by the probate court, fees charged, and
perhaps most significantly the views of the individuals tasked
with performing this function of their roles in the proceedings.
In 2007, the General Assembly added the requirement that
any individual selected to serve as a guardian ad litem “shall have
sufficient experience and/or training in dealing with elderly
persons and persons with incapacities and/or disabilities and
understanding of his or her role as guardian ad litem to be able to
properly discharge such duties.”139 Each probate court was also
mandated to “maintain a list of persons deemed qualified to serve
as a guardian ad litem and shall appoint from that list on a
rotating basis.”140
The General Assembly also addressed a problem that had
developed in certain instances when guardians ad litem became
confused as to their roles. Specifically, some guardians ad litem
viewed themselves as advocates for the respondent, rather than as
agents of the court whose duties culminate in a report submitted
to the court, and would occasionally seek to continue their
involvement in the case by morphing into counsel for the
respondent or even guardian. The 2007 legislature made clear
that the identity of a guardian ad litem and that of potential
counsel for a respondent were distinct by stating that “[a]ny
guardian ad litem appointed for a respondent shall be ineligible to
serve as legal counsel, temporary guardian or permanent
guardian for that respondent.”141

138.
139.
140.
141.

2007 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1760.
2007 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1762.
Id.
Id.
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The intended limitation of the guardian ad litem to an
investigatory and reporting role was further made clear in the
2007 legislation by addition of new subsection (g) to Rhode Island
General Law section 33-15-7(g). This subsection provides that
“[t]he guardian ad litem shall not interfere with interested parties
and their counsel in gathering and presenting evidence according
to court orders and rules of discovery and evidence.”142 Section
33-15-7(g) further provides that “[t]he guardian ad litem may be
called and confronted as a witness regarding his or her
conclusions as submitted by report and the extent of his or her
personal knowledge concerning the respondent.”143
Finally, the 2007 legislation adopted in statute the practice of
many probate courts, adding a new subsection (h) to section 33-157, setting a cap of $400 on the fees of a guardian ad litem, while
providing that “[t]he court has discretion to award guardian ad
litem fees in excess of the cap if the circumstances warrant.”144
B. Probate Commission
The Probate Commission authorized by the 1996 Act was
formed and became active shortly thereafter.145 For example, the
2004 and 2007 legislation referenced above were derived from
deliberations of the Probate Commission.
In 2014, the Probate Commission studied the legislation
which sought to enact the Uniform Adult Guardianship and
Protection Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (UAGPPJA).146 While
laudable in its goal of dealing with issues arising when more than
one jurisdiction is involved in the guardianship of an individual,
like most uniform acts, the UAGPPJA required tailoring to
operate effectively within a particular jurisdiction—in this case,
Rhode Island and its probate courts.
On April 1, 2014, the Probate Commission adopted several
proposed revisions to the Senate version of the UAGPPJA
legislation, including reaffirming that the existing jurisdictional
142. 2007 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1763.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The author, in his capacity as a then State Representative, served as
the first Chair of the Probate Commission, and subsequently, including to the
writing of this article, as its Vice-Chair.
146. S. 2548 (R.I. 2014); H.R. 7687 (R.I. 2014).
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basis of a Rhode Island probate court to appoint a guardian would
remain intact. The General Assembly, considering the Probate
Commission’s recommendations, adopted a modified version of the
UAGPPJA the following year.147
CONCLUSION

The lack of any major legislation since 1996 may be perceived
as a reflection of a “mission accomplished.” That is, after the
virtual gutting of the existing substantive and procedural
requirements for instituting and administering guardianships in
Rhode Island which occurred in the mid-1980’s through the mid1990’s, and after the necessary fine tuning which occurred in the
approximately ten year period thereafter, Rhode Island’s
guardianship laws can be perceived by some as having largely
effected the goal of the reformers.
Another view is that lack of further substantial changes to
Rhode Island’s guardianship’s laws is the result of complacency.
For example, since the Wingspread conference in 1988, whose
recommendations inspired and informed the reforms of the 1992
Act, the National Guardianship Conference has convened again
twice, in each instance producing further recommendations.148 In
addition, the National Guardianship Association (NGA), which
adopted the first NGA Standards of Practice for Guardians in
2000, has produced new editions of its Standards of Practice in
2003, 2007, and in 2013.149
As evidenced by the diversity of members of the Guardianship
Commission formed by the General Assembly in 1990, in order to
be effective reform of guardianship laws must take into account
the views of a number and a diversity of stakeholders. Reform is a
challenging and arduous process requiring significant political will
and energy. And such will and energy in turn often require a
crisis atmosphere, like that sparked by the AP reports which was
the catalysis for the Wingspread Conference, which in turn
informed the work of the Guardianship Commission in creating,
147. 2015 R.I. PUB. LAWS 1160, 1254.
148. See Third National Guardianship Summit Standards and
Recommendations, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1191 (2012); Wingspan—The Second
National Guardianship Conference, Recommendations, 31 STETSON L. REV.
595 (2001).
149. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, 2 (NAT. GUARDIANSHIP ASSOC. 2013).
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and the General Assembly in enacting the 1992 Act.
Certainly reports of serious abuse and neglect in
guardianship proceedings arise periodically in Rhode Island, as
they do on in other states. However, without a critical mass of
such cases or analogue to the AP report, it is unlikely that the
political will which resulted in the systemic reforms of the 1992
Act will be mustered. For many who consider reforms of the early
1990s, with their continual review by the Probate Commission and
periodic revisions by the General Assembly, to be adequate, this is
a positive. For those who believe that a more systemic change is
again needed, it is not.

